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The Mojave Desert as
Grounds for Change:
Clarifying Property Rights in
California's Groundwater
to Make Extraction
Sustainable Statewide
By Kelley J. Hart&

Because most available surface water
sources have already been exploited, Californians have increasingly relied upon groundwater and are pressuring policymakers to
devise creative solutions using groundwater
to meet the thirsty state's demand for water.
However, many groundwater basins in California have already been severely overdrafted.
California's groundwater depletion problem
is two-fold: one of both supply and demand.
First, groundwater is often extracted at the
cost of long-term basin sustainability. Second, groundwater demand reflects wasteful
consumption habits by Californians. Although inflated water demand is a serious issue, this paper seeks to address only
problems of groundwater supply.
California law governing the state's 450
known groundwater basins does not adequately recognize the scientific complexity of
groundwater that gives it persistent commons' attributes.' In some situations, a commons' tragedy can be avoided by imposition
of a private property system. However, because the common law-based private property system in groundwater remains plagued
by uncertainty, this precious natural resource
is now partially depleted and contaminated.
Moreover, the California legislature has basiSStaff Attorney
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1. For an explanation of the "tragedy of the commons," see infra Part II.A.
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cally ignored the needs of its groundwater basins.

2

Recent events concerning the Mojave
Desert highlight the dire need for groundwater rights clarification. First, the California
Supreme Court rejected a trial court's physical solution 3 to bind parties claiming ambiguous rights to extract groundwater. 4 Water
extraction continues unchecked 'by basin
users who have opted out of the stipulated
judgment. Second, the Metropolitan Water
District ("MWD") has seriously considered
partnering with Cadiz, Inc. ("Cadiz") on a conjunctive use and water marketing project to
5
exploit the aquifer beneath Cadiz's property.
Much of the land overlying the aquifer system
is treasured national park and wilderness set
aside to protect rare and endangered plant
and animal species. Cadiz proposes to artificially add and remove water from the aquifer,
jeopardizing the natural balance of the neighboring desert ecosystem in the process. To
prevent overdrafting this groundwater basin
and others, usufructuary rights must be clarified before anyone initiates projects of this
sort.
Only a statewide approach can address
the hydrologic system of surface and groundwater flows that interchange above and below
the ground irrespective of municipal and
county boundaries. Since the common law
cannot resolve the crisis, the legislature must
speak through statute. But because claims
are highly individualized, a catered, quasi-ju2. California's new water planning legislation, Senate
Bill 221, Senate Bill 610 and Assembly Bill 901, do not begin to resolve the state water shortage. While legislators
should be commended for attempting to add a layer of accountability to urban water use supply with this recent legislation, they unfortunately get no closer to a long-term
solution. Each bill essentially requires that large-scale
project developers locate a water supply for future inhabitants. This legislation addresses neither the problem of
supply nor of demand, instead putting the onus improperly
on the middleman, the water agency. There is still no incentive for individuals to reduce consumption and no incentive for pumpers to reduce overdrafting. Instead, there
is more incentive to pressure water agencies to provide
more water.
3. A "physical solution" is an arrangement between
parties "fashioned when the strict application of water
rights in a case will result in waste and some other appropriation of water would protect vested rights and prevent

waste."

JEFFREYS. ASHLEY

AND ZACHARY

A.

SMITH,

GROUND-

dicial solution is also necessary. The California legislature should require the
adjudication of rights in each basin. The statute must detail central recordkeeping and enforcement mechanisms to assure that
groundwater allocation rights are respected.
Although this proposal will not entirely resolve the water supply crisis, it will stabilize
groundwater resources, which constitute 30%
6
of the state's applied water source.
Part I of this paper describes groundwater resources in California, as well as the
science and state law governing groundwater.
Part 11 argues that groundwater supply
problems, namely overdraft, can only be
solved by state legislation mandating adjudication of all claims to water use in California's groundwater basins. 7 Part II proposes a
statewide system for adjudication and comprehensive groundwater management.
Part I
A. Water in California, Where Supply Can't
Meet Demand
Californians already demand more water
than is available. Average annual water use
in 1995 was 79.5 million acre-feet ("maf"), 8 a
level of demand that exceeded supply by 1.6
maf.9 Urban, agricultural, and environmental
users procured water from the following
sources: 65.1 maf from surface water, 12.5
maf from groundwater, and 0.3 maf from reWATER MANAGEMENT

IN THE

WEST

45 (University of Nebraska

Press 1999).
4. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 cal. 4th
1224 (2000).

5. See infra Part II.A.
6.

CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT

OF WATER RESOURCES, CALIFOR-

160-98, ES3-5 (1998), available at http://rubicon.water.ca.gov/bI60index.html.
7. Rights to water in fifteen basins have been adjudicated under our common law system. See infra note 102.
8. To visualize one acre-foot of water, imagine one
acre of land covered by one foot of water. One acre-foot is
approximately 326,000 gallons. According to 1995 average
water demand projections, urban uses demanded 8.8 maf,
agriculture required 33.8 maf, and environmental uses reNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE

quired 36.9 maf.

CALIFORNIA

SOURCES, supra note 6,

9. Id.

BULLETIN

DEPARTMENT
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at ES5-2 (Table ES5-1).

WATER

RE-
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cycling and desalinization processes.' 0
Groundwater supplies about 30% of the
state's urban and agrarian water needs.''
The California Department of Water Resources ("Department") recognizes that many
groundwater basins are already overdrafted,
but believes that statewide groundwater overdraft will not increase by 2020. By 1980, the
Department had already identified 42 overdrafted groundwater basins.' 2 About 1.5 maf!
year were overdrafted by 1995.13 The Department expects overdraft to decline to 1.1 maf/
year by 202014 even though the state's population will likely increase by 15 million people
over the same period, with an estimated demand of an additional 3.2 maf of water each
year.' 5 The Department projects that increased demand will be met, in part, by extracting an additional 165,000 acre-feet of
groundwater, presumably from basins that
can spare the water and still maintain a safe
yield. 16
Pressure to extract more water from aquifers will also increase because California
must find a substitute source for almost
800,000 acre-feet/year of Colorado River
water. California has historically diverted as
much as 5.2 maf from the Colorado River an10. Id.

1I.

GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY

ICAL WATER SHORTAGE

DROUGHT PLANNING

CONTINGENCY

PLAN

PANEL, CRIT-

OF

WATER RESOURCES,

zona, California and Nevada, the Lower Basin states, to select different terms if agreed upon by state compact.).

supra

note 6, at ES3-7 (Table ES3-2).

20.

CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT

OF WATER

RESOURCES,

supra

note 6, at ES5-2.

14. Id.
15. Id. at ES5-3.
16. CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, supra

note 6, at ES3-5 (Table ES3-1) and ES3-7 (Table ES3-2).
Overdraft occurs when the amount of groundwater ex-

tracted from

The California Water Code defines
groundwater as "all water beneath the surface
of the earth within the zone below the water
table in which the soil is completely saturated with water, but does not include water
which flows in known and definite channels."22 The law distinguishes percolating
water from that which flows in underground
streams, 23 but water moving beneath the sur-

19. See Department of the Interior, Record of Decision:
Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, Final Environmental Impact Statement, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,772-7,782 (2001).

12. ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 39.
DEPARTMENT

B. The Science of Groundwater

1-4 (December 29,

2000).
13. CALIFORNIA

nually,' 7 although technically entitled to only
4.4 maf under the Boulder Canyon Project
Act, according to the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California.'8 Pursuant to the Colorado
River Interim Surplus Guidelines issued January 25, 2001, California has until 2015 to reduce its diversions from 5.2 maf to 4.4 maf.19
.The Department expects that void will be filled with surface water from the Central Valley
Project and State Water Project, in addition
to increased extraction from groundwater basins. 20 There are 450 known groundwater basins in California containing up to 850 million
acre-feet of water. 2' Despite increased reliance on this resource, the state does not regulate groundwater extraction.

the

aquifer is greater than

water replenishing the aquifer. DAVID

the

amount of

DROUGHT

& ERIC
ARTHUR L. LITTLEWORTH

L.

GARNER, CALIFORNIA

2 (1995); State Water Resources Control Board,
Ground Water in California 2 at www.swrcb.ca.gov/general/
publications/docs/ground-water.pdf (last visited May 6,
2002).

H. GETCHES. WATER

LAW IN A NUTSHELL 239 (West Publishing Co. 1997). Overdraft is measured as a long-term trend, and should not reflect the annual difference between extraction and recharge
from natural fluctuations between drought and flood years.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 6, at
ES3-5. Negative effects of overdrafting are discussed infra
Part I.C.
17. GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY

21.
WATER

PLANNING

PANEL,

supra

note 11,at 2-4.
18. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565, 580 (1963)
(The Act devised a numeric allocation, but permitted Ari-

22.

CAL. WATER CODE

§ 10752(a) (Deering 2001).

23. Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 617-18
(1899); Vineland Irrigation Dist. v. Azusa Irrigating Co., 126
Cal. 486, 494 (1899) ("It is essential to the nature of percolating waters that they do not form part of the body or flow,
surface or subterranean, of any stream. They may either be
rain waters which are slowly infiltrating through the soil, or
they may be waters seeping through the banks or bed of a
stream which have so far left the bed and the other waters
as to have lost their character as part of the flow.")
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face is more complicated than the law suggests.

scribes "the ease through which water flows

In the natural hydrologic cycle, "some of
Ithel water that falls to the earth's surface will
seep into the ground and be pulled downward by gravity until it reaches a depth where
' 24
the subsurface is saturated with water."
This level is the water table, and groundwater

comparatively large gaps through which the
water can pass in sand and gravel so it is
characterized as having high porosity and
35
high permeability.

flows

beneath

it.

25

Groundwater

moves

within the geologic formation beneath the
water table, in both confined and unconfined
aquifers. 26 In a confined aquifer, water is
under pressure because it is overlaid by impermeable rock or clay through which it cannot

pass. 27

In

contrast,

water

in

an

unconfined aquifer can move from the water
table to the base of the aquifer because there
is no impermeable geologic material to
28
thwart its passage.
Aquifers are often hydrologically connected to each other and to surface water. 29
The locational flow of water will vary depend30
ing on the water level in each system.
Water will percolate from a system of higher
elevation down to the base water table
level. 3 I Groundwater moves slower than surface water because groundwater is usually
traveling through the pores of geologic formations. 32 There is immense variation in porosity between and within geologic
formations. Higher porosity means that more
water can be stored in the rock.33 Permeability corresponds to the size of pores and de24. Erik Swenson, Public Trust Doctrine and Groundwater
Rights, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 363, 372 (1999).
25. id.

through a geologic formation.

27. Id. n.78 (citing C.W. FETTER, APPLIED HYDROGEOLOGY
5, 101-02 (2d ed. 1988)); Ella Foley-Gannon, Institutional Arrangements for Conjunctive Water Management in California and
Analysis of Legal Reform Alternatives, 6 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 273, 279 (2000).
28. Swenson, supra note 24, at 372 n.78.
29. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27.
30. Id.

31. Id.
32. Swenson, supra note 24, at 372.
33. Id. at 373.
34. Id.

35. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27.

There are

C. Groundwater Quality and Quantity in
California Today
The percolation process normally filters
out contaminants in water as it moves
through the strata of geologic formations.
However, groundwater will transport certain
types of contaminants in soil saturated with
chemicals. As a result, a number of California
aquifers are contaminated by pesticides and
other agricultural by-products. 36 Some have
been degraded by salt water intrusion and
others by industrial chemicals. As a result,
the quality of the groundwater depends not
only on the quality of water percolating from
the surface, but also on what is already deposited in the sediments through which the
37
water passes.
As mentioned in the first section, at least
forty-two of California's groundwater basins
are already overdrafted. 38

There are many

negative consequences of overdrafting an aquifer. First, because the water table drops,
extractors must dig deeper wells and pumping becomes more expensive. 39 Second,
when an aquifer is overdrawn for an extended
period, the water-bearing geologic formations
36. Jodie T. Raccio, Agricultural Use of Pesticides: Farmer
and Manufacturer Liability for Groundwater Contamination, 3 ALB.
L.J. SCa.& TECH. 185, 187 (1993) (citing PATRICKW. HOLDEN,
PESTICIDES

26. id.

'34

AND

IN FOUR STATES

GROUNDWATER

QUALITY - ISSUES AND

PROBLEMS

4 (1986)).

37. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 280.
38.

ASHLEY

& SMITH,

supra note 3, at 39.

39. See Gregory S.Weber, Twenty Years of Local Groundwater Export Legislation in California: Lessons from a Patchwork
Quilt, 34 NAT. RESOURCES 1. 657, 660 (1994); Benjamin R.
Vance, Comment, Total Aquifer Management: A New Approach to
Groundwater Protection, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 803, 804-805 (1996);
GETCHES, supra note 16, at 246 (describing the increased
costs of extracting water from greater depths); Susan Batty
Peterson, Designation and Protection of Critical Groundwater Areas, 1991 BYU L. Rev 1393, 1398 (1991); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Allocation and Protection: A United States Case

Study,

EARTH SYSTEMS: PROCESSES

AND

ISSUES

476, 488-489

(W.G. Ernst ed., 2000); Sandra Postel, When the world's wells
Run Dry, WORLD WATCH 30, 33 (Sept.-Oct. 1999) (describing
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are compacted. The land is pulled downward,
causing subsidence at the surface. 40

area of the Santa Clara Valley subsided 28
feet between 1933 and 196741 and some parts
of the San Joaquin Valley have subsided 30
2
feet because of groundwater overdrafting.4
Third, vegetation above an overdrafted aquifer is likely to die as the surface is "desertified." 43 Finally, salt-water intrusion
irreversibly contaminates aquifers near the
44

coast .

D. California's Groundwater Law
Responsibility for groundwater protec45
tion has been left to the individual states.
In California, the right to use groundwater is
a real property right. 46 The state law pertain-

ing to groundwater rights has largely developed through common law, but the California
Constitution and the California Water Code
also provide some limited directives.
how increased pumping costs has driven some groundwater users to abandon pumping.).
40. Peterson, supra note 39, at 1395; Thompson, supra
note 39, at 489.
41. Christopher B Amandes, Controlling Land Surface
Subsidence. A Proposal for a Market Based Regulatory Scheme, 31
UCLA L. REV. 1208, 1213 (1984).
42. State Water Resources Control Board, supra note
21;

ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 40; TERRYL. ANDERSON,
WATER CRIsIS: ENDING THE POLICY DROUGHT 99 (The Johns Hop-

kins University Press 1983).
43. Thompson, supra note 39, at 489; Deborah Moore
and Zach Willey, Water in the American West: Institutional Evolution and Environmental Restoration in the 21st Century, 62 U COLO.
L. REV. 775, 776-780 (1991) (describing the environmental
drought generally, without distinguishing groundwater
from surface water depletion).
44. ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 40; Peterson, supra

note 39, at 1397; Thompson, supra note 39, at 489.
45.

UNITED

STATES

GENERAL

POLLUTION: MORE EMPHASIS

ACCOUNTING

NEEDED

ON

OFFICE,

PREVENTION

IN

WATER

EPA's

(stating that
"lbloth EPA and the states agree that the primary responsiEFFORTS TO PROTECT

GROUNDWATER

1. judge-Made Law

One

13 (1991)

bility for protecting groundwater belongs to the states").
46. Note that this is a usufructuary right, which
means it is a right to use water, not an ownership right in
groundwater per se. ERIN SCHILLER & ELIZABETH FOWLER, END ING CALIFORNIA'S WATER CRISIS 33 (Pacific Research Institute
1999).
47. Mark T. Kanazawa, Efficiency in Western Water Law:
The Development of The California Doctrine, 1850-1911, 27 1. LEGAL
STUD. 159, 162 (1998).

When California became a state in 1850,
the California legislature adopted English
common law and repealed all laws of Spanish
and Mexican origin governing the land except
those stipulated in the Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo. 47 Among the few rights they pre-

served were Pueblo water rights, which are the
rights of a municipal successor to a Spanish/
Mexican pueblo to reasonable and beneficial
use of the water underlying the historic
pueblo. 48 Apart from Pueblo rights, California courts followed English common law to
adjudicate water disputes. 49 As such, courts
initially applied the absolute ownership rule, giving landowners the right to unlimited extraction of water beneath their land regardless of
negative impacts on neighboring groundwater users. 50 The landowner's right to pump
the water beneath her land is called an overly51
ing right.
48. ScoTT S. SLATER, CALIFORNIA WATER LAW AND POLICY,
Vol. I, 5-3 (Butterworth Legal Publishers 2001); see also Kevin L. Patrick & Kelly E. Archer, A Comparison of State Groundwater Laws, 30 TULSA L.J. 123, 140 n.143 (1994) (for a
description of their origin and cases addressing Pueblo
rights).

49. English common law distinguishes surface water
from groundwater. For surface water disputes, courts applied the riparian principle that landowners who lived adjacent to surface water are entitled to use it, and their rights

are derived from their use of the water. Kanazawa, supra
note 47, at 163. The right "is usufructuary, and consists not
so much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its use." Id.
Courts later adopted a "no-injury" rule. The California Supreme Court explained that, "lal riparian proprietor, while
he has the undoubted right to use the water flowing over
his land, must use it as to do the least possible harm to
other riparian proprietors." Id. at 164 (quoting Crandall v.
Woods, 8 Cal. 136, 141 (1857)). Then California courts recognized a right of prior appropriation to surface water.
Mark Kanazawa argues that courts created prior appropriation rights to address gold miners' needs to divert and use
non-riparian water in California. Id. at 165. Subsequently
the court grappled with employing a riparian and appropriation system simultaneously for surface water, giving riparian owners priority and the right to transfer their interests
to appropriators. Id. at 168-172.

50. 62 Cal. lur. 3d § 394 (1981).
51. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal.
4th 1224 (2000) ("lAin overlying right . . . is the owner's

right to take water from the ground underneath for use on
his land within the basin or watershed; the right is based
on ownership of land and is appurtenant thereto.") (quot-
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In the 1903 case of Katz v. Walkinshaw, the
California Supreme Court abandoned the
doctrine of absolute ownership and imposed
the correlative rights doctrine.5 2 Under this rule,
overlying users hold in common the right to
use the groundwater for reasonable and beneficial use of the aquifer's safe yield. 53 All
overlying landowners hold this right, irrespec54
tive of whether they withdraw groundwater.
Extracting up to the safe yield means removing only as much water as will be recharged
into the aquifer.5

5

If users withdraw more

water than the safe yield, then all overlying
users must reduce their use to a fair and just
proportion relative to the other overlying
users. 56 When there is surplus water, it may
be appropriated by others who do not have
5
overlying rights.

7

Besides Pueblo and overlying rights, the
courts recognize two other types of rights in
groundwater usage. An appropriation right is
the right to extract groundwater surplus to
that needed by overlying users and transport
it to land that does not overlie the groundwater basin from which it was extracted. 58 To
get appropriation rights, one merely withdraws the surplus water and puts it to beneficial use.5

9

A prescriptive right is gained by

pumping continuously for the prescription
period when prior rights-holders have notice
60
and there is no surplus water in the basin.
There are priorities between and among
the rightholders. Pueblo rights trump all
other claims of use.6 1 The other three are prioritized as follows:
ing California Water Service Co. v.Edward Sidebotham &
Son, 224 Cal. App. 2d 715, 725 (1964)).
52.

LITrLEWORTH

& GARNER, supra note 21, at 49.

53. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 144 (1903).
54.

ASHLEY

&

SMITH,

supra note 3, at 45.

55. ANNE SCHNEIDER, GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA
99 (Governor's Comm'n to Review Cal. Water Rights Law,
Staff Paper No. 2. 1977).
56. Katz, 141 Cal. at 134-36; ANDERSON, supra note 42,
at 97; 62 Cal. Jur. 3d § 401 (1981).
57. Katz, 141 Cal. at 135-36.
58. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 285.
59. SCHILLER & FOWLER, supra note 46, at 7-8.

IBletween overlying users, no temporal priority exists. Rather, in times of
shortage, each is entitled to a reasonable share of the common supply. As
between appropriators, temporal priority exists; the rights of a pumper
first in time are senior to those of a
later appropriator. As between overlying users and appropriators, overlying users have priority, regardless of
the date of the inception of the overlying use. Prescriptive rights-holders
can quantify their rights as against
both prior appropriators and overlying owners under formulas developed
62
by the courts.
In sum, the appropriator's use is limited to
the amount of the surplus water in the
groundwater basin. If there is no surplus
water, the appropriator is not entitled to take
any water, unless he has acquired prescrip63
tive rights.
Three key cases have further defined
groundwater law in California. The first arose
after the Raymond Basin was overdrafted for
more than twenty years. In Pasadena v. Alhambra, the California Supreme Court imposed
use limits to reduce extraction to the basin's
safe yield. 64 Rather than ascertain the overlying and appropriative rights of each party, the
Court reasoned that because the basin had
been overdrafted for so many years, all parties had developed mutually prescriptive
rights against all others and each must reduce their use proportionate to the quantity
they had acquired by prescription.6 5 The
Court determined the prescriptive quantity by
looking at each pumper's annual average ex60. To gain a prescriptive right, use must be (1) reasonable and beneficial, (2) open and notorious, (3) hostile
and adverse, (4) continuous and uninterrupted for five
years, and (5) exclusive and under a claim of right. City of
Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199. 281-82 (1975).

61.

SLATER,

supra note 48, at 5-3.

62. Gregory S. Weber, Forging A More Coherent Groundwater Policy in California: State and Federal Constitutional Law

Challenges to Local Groundwater Export Restrictions, 34
CLARA L. REV. 373, 375-76 (1994).

SANTA

63. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d
908, 926-27 (1949).
64. id. at 929.
65. Id. at 928-933.
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traction for the five years preceding the lawsuit.
After Pasadena v. Alhambra was decided in
1949, the mutual prescription doctrine 66 facilitated negotiations because parties could calculate individual extraction formulations
based on recent use that became binding
when incorporated into the Court's judgment
instead of grappling over figures based on ab67
stract overlying and appropriation rights.
As one commentator noted, "Ibly agreeing to
apply a formula, the parties have avoided adversary proceedings in many situations where
determination of complex appropriative priorities might in any event be impossible because of the insufficient and unreliable
data."

68

Mutual prescription's utility declined,
however, after City of Los Angeles v. City of San
Fernando. The California Supreme Court announced that the notice requirement of prescriptive rights is not met simply by the
lowering of the water table, despite the Alhambra Court's finding that a lowered water
table provides notice because it is overdraft. 69 The San Fernando Court redefined
overdraft to be long term decline of the water
table, excluding natural fluctuations.7 0 The
court also declared that prescriptive rights
71
cannot be gained against public entities.
So mutual prescription does not exist when a
72
public entity is party to an adjudication.
The San Fernando Court also critiqued the
equitable apportionment remedy lower
66. The mutual prescription doctrine is the concept
developed by the Pasadena Court that all basin extractors
can simultaneously establish prescriptive rights against
one another when a basin is overdrafted through the prescriptive statutory period because all pumpers have extracted water contrary to the preexisting rights of one
another for that period. Once extractors' rights are perceived as mutually prescriptive, courts may determine indi
vidual extraction limits by looking at each extractor's
historical use during the prescriptive period. GETCHES,
supra note 16, at 250.
67.

SCHNEIDER,

68.

ASHLEY

courts often employed after finding mutual
prescription. The Court said, "[a true equitable apportionment would take into account
many more factors." 73

In footnote 61, the

Court noted that the United States Supreme
Court equitably apportioned water in Nebraska
v. Wyoming, and further stated:
[aIpportionment calls for the exercise
of an informed judgment on a consideration of many factors. Priority of
appropriation is the guiding principle.
But physical and climatic conditions,
the consumptive use of water in the
several sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the
availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to
upstream areas as compared to the
benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former these are all relevant factors. They
are merely an illustrative, not an ex74
haustive catalogue.
The San Fernando Court's emphasis on ordering priorities when determining equitable apportionment suggests that even when all
parties to the action are private individuals, a
court cannot get around characterizing priorities by finding mutual prescription.
The California Supreme Court reaffirmed
the groundwater priority rights system in City
of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 7 5 unanimously holding that "although it is clear that
makes the first party's taking an invasion constituting a basis for injunctive relief to the other party. But if the other
party is not on notice that the overdraft exists, such adverse
taking does not cause the commencement of the prescriptive period.").
70. Id. at 280.
71. Id. at 270-77 (interpreting a 1968 amendment to
California Civil Code § 1007 to create a broad prohibition
on obtaining prescription against water that is, in the
words of the statute, "dedicated to a public use.").

supra note 55, at 23-24.
72.

SCHNEIDER,

supra note 55, at 31-32.

& SMITH, supra note 3, at 46-47 (oUOTING

D. ARCHIBALD, APPROPRIATIVE WATER RIGHTS IN CALI23-24 (Governor's Comm'n to Review California
Water Rights Law 1977).
MARYBELLE

73. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 265.

FORNIA

69. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 282. ("The commencement of overdraft provides the element of adversity which

74. Id. at 265 n.61.
75. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal.
4th 1224 (2000).
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a trial court may impose a physical solution
to achieve a practical allocation of water to
competing interests, the solution's general
purpose cannot simply ignore the priority
rights of the parties asserting them." 76 The
court further directed that "a court may
neither change priorities among the water
rights holders nor eliminate vested rights in
applying the solution without first considering them in relation to the reasonable use
doctrine." 77 In City of Barstow, the trial court
had enforced a physical solution that set an
annual production limit for each party based
on prior use with no consideration for preexisting legal water rights. 78 The trial court reasoned that "the doctrine of reasonable and
beneficial use, as established by Article X,
Section 2 of the California Constitution, required an equitable apportionment of all
rights when a basin is in overdraft." 79 The Supreme Court disagreed, insisting that "Iciase
law simply does not support applying an equitable apportionment to water use claims
unless all claimants have correlative rights;
for example, when parties establish mutual
prescription." 80
The California Supreme
Court upheld the appellate court's disposition that parties may stipulate, to a physical
solution not based on their legal priorities if
they agree to waive their existing water
rights, 8 1 but the rights of non-stipulating parties are not affected by the stipulated judg76. Id. at 1250.
77. Id. at 1237.

ment.8

2

Prior use may still be a common

method of resolving disputes if parties stipulate to using it, but City of Barstow may slow
pre-judgment negotiation of water rights because parties will not be bound to commit to
a physical solution based on prior use unless
83
mutual prescription has been established.
2. California Statute-Based Law
In response to real and threatened depletion of water sources, the California Constitution was amended in 1928 by citizen
initiative. 84 Article X, Section 2 declares that
"Itlhe right to water or to the use or flow of
water in or from any natural stream or water
course in this state is and shall be limited to
such water as shall be reasonably required for
the beneficial use to be served, and such
right does and shall not extend to the waste
or unreasonable method of diversion." The
amendment reinforces the correlative rights
doctrine's reasonable and beneficial use requirement.85
The California legislature has not yet defined property rights in groundwater use.
There is very little state law governing
groundwater. 86 California Water Code Section 2100 authorizes the State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB") to police
the use of water in the state, but does not
require it.8 7 The Water Code also gives the
California Supreme Court later held that it also applied to
groundwater. See, e.g., Peabody v.City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d.
351, 367 (1935).

78. Id. at 1235-36.
79. Id. at 1238.
80. Id. at 1248.
81. Id. at 1256 n.17.
82. Id.at 1253, 1256 (The California Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court decision that the physical solution may bind stipulating parties, but the Cardozo
appellants, a non-stipulating party, still have their overlying rights protected.).
83. After this decision, a trial court may impose a
physical solution based on prior use instead of legal priorities, so long as it first finds that mutual prescription exists.
After San Fernando, in order to find mutual prescription, the
basin must be suffering from overdraft for at least five consecutive years with notice to users and a public agency has
not reserved a legal priority in the basin.
84. ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 45. The amendment was inspired by concerns for surface water, but the

85. SCHNEIDER, supra note 55, at 77-78. judicial determinations of what is reasonable and beneficial use varies.
Whether or not a court restricts use may depend on the
perceived scarcity of water at the time of the suit. Tulare
Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal.
2d 489, 567 (1935). Some courts give great weight to the
"ever increasing need for the conservation of water in this
state, an inescapable reality of life quite apart from its express recognition in the 1928 amendment." Joslin v. Marin
Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d. 132, 140 (1967).
86. There are a few state statutes addressing groundwater contamination, but they will not be addressed here
as groundwater quality is beyond the scope of this paper.
87. The SWRCB can initiate a basin adjudication to
prevent destruction or irreparable injury to groundwater

quality.

CAL. WATER CODE

§ 2100 (Deering 2001).
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SWRCB power to referee adjudication of
groundwater rights and investigate matters
pertaining to adjudication of rights upon a
court's request. 88 In Imperial Irrigation District v.
State Water Resources Control Bd., a California
Appellate Court found that SWRCB may de89
clare standards of reasonable use.

which may levy taxes, issue bonds, set service
rates, and participate in litigation affecting

The legislature has also established
groundwater extraction monitoring requirements, but they only apply to four counties in
the state. 90 Individuals who extract more
than twenty-five acre-feet of water each year
from any basin in Riverside, San Bernardino,
Los Angeles, or Ventura County must file a
"Notice of Extraction and Diversion of Water"
with the SWRCB. 9' If an extractor does not
file a notice of her location and quantity of
pumping, her use is not recognized under the

97
management plans pursuant to AB 3030.

law.

92

The legislature has passed many bills to
facilitate local groundwater management.
For example, the California Water Code includes a number of special district acts. Each
act creates a specific geographic groundwater
management district with enumerated functions. 93

The legislature authorizes special

districts to perform an array of functions,
such as determining groundwater capacity,
managing flow in and out of its basins, setting quotas for use when the basins are overdrafted, and prosecuting unreasonable
users.94 The legislature has also authorized

various types of water districts (agencies),

users in their jurisdiction. 95

Cities and counties may use their police
power to regulate groundwater by ordinance
98
as long as there is no conflict with state law.
About 30% of California's counties adopted
groundwater ordinances, usually requiring a
conditional use permit before water can be
exported from the county of origin. 99
E. Groundwater Basin Adjudication in
Practice
Competing rights for groundwater are
generally not adjudicated until after a
groundwater basin becomes overdrafted. A
senior appropriator or overlying right-holder
typically brings an action against a junior appropriator, seeking an injunction to halt the
junior appropriator's use. To set the order of
priority, the court must then characterize
each extractor's use. "One product of the adjudication is judicial determination of the nature and quantity of each groundwater user's
share of the basin's safe yield."'10 0
After rights are adjudicated, the court
typically appoints a watermaster, who then

88. CAL. WATER CODE § 2000 (Deering 2001).

FORNIA DEPARTMENT

89. 225 Cal. App. 3d 548, 561 (1990).

GENERAL COMPARISON

90. See CAL. WATER CODE § 4999-5008 (Deering 2001).
91. Id. at §§4999, 5001.
92. Id. at § 5004. The statute imposes no other penalties, except that under § 5003 the extractor cannot gain a
prescription right against others.
93. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE App. §§ 118-101 to 118901 established the Monterey Peninsula Water Management District in Monterey County. For a list of other specific districts, see Eric L. Garner, Michelle Ouellette, and
Richard L. Sharff, Jr., Institutional Reforms in California Groundwater Law, 25 PAC. L.J. 1021, 1033 n.114 (1994).
94. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 291-293.
95. ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 43; Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 673, 697 n.80 (1993) (providing a list of
sources that discuss success of these districts): see also CALI-

Assembly Bill

3030 grants these local agencies the right to
adopt groundwater management plans, but
not the right to make binding determinations
of individuals' water rights.96 Approximately
150 agencies have adopted groundwater

OF WATER RESOURCES
OF

CALIFORNIA

BULLETIN

No. 155-94,

WATER DISTRICT ACTS

(1994)

(list
of allgeneral and special districts created by the California legislature).

96. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10750- 10755.4 (West 2001)
(for terms of groundwater management plans); see also Garner, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at 1032. Section
10753.8(b) does not authorize agencies to make binding
determinations of individual users' rights.
97.
note

GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY DROUGHT PLANNING PANEL. supra
also CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RE-

11,at 2-7; see

SOURCES, GROUNDWATER

MANAGEMENT

IN

CALIFORNIA: A REPORT

TO THE LEGISLATURE 9-11 (1999).

98. Baldwin v.County of Tehama, 31 Cal. App..4th
166, 175 (1994).

99.

GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY

DROUGHT

PLANNING

note 11,at 2-7.
100. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 286.

PANEL,

supra
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manages the quantity of water in the basin.
The court may give the watermaster authority
to devise methods to prevent overdraft, and
the watermaster may petition to have other
responsibilities, such as oversight of water
quality. The court usually reserves the right
to review its order when conditions
change.101 Sixteen groundwater basins in
0 2

California have been adjudicated.1

Adjudication of all four basins in the San
Gabriel watershed illustrates how the process
of arriving at effective management varies.
(1) The Raymond Basin is governed by adjudication from the famous San Fernando case
discussed supra, Part I.D.I. Assigned pumping rights limit the amount of extraction to
safe yield. However, the maximum annual
extraction figure was adjusted once because
the original estimate of safe yield was too
low.10 3 A board serves as the watermaster to

monitor pumping and the basin's condition.
Water producers bear the costs of administering this system.'

0

4

(2) Initially, a water dis-

trict tried to manage the West Basin without
first adjudicating individuals' extraction
rights. 10 5 When that failed, water users
sought to clarify their rights via adjudication.'

06

Now a California Department of Re-

sources field office serves as the basin
watermaster and assures that the West Basin
is

artificially

replenished

10 7

because

the

rights assigned exceed the natural safe yield.
However, pumpers pay taxes to cover these
101. Id. at 289.
102. In order of final court adjudication, these basins
are: 1944 Raymond Basin, 1958 Cucamonga Basin, 1961
West Coast Basin; 1965 Central Basin: 1966 Santa Margarita River Watershed; 1969 San Bernardino Basin; 1972
Cummings Basin; 1973 Tehachapi Basin; 1973 Main San
Gabriel Basin; 1977 Warren Valley Basin; 1978 Chino Basin;
1979 Upper Los Angeles River Area; 1980 Scott River System; 1985 Puente; 1996 Santa Paula Basin, and 1998
Mojave Basin. See Ronald Kaiser, Deep Trouble: Options for
Managing The Hidden Threat of Aquifer Depletion in Texas, 32 TEx,
TECH L. REV. 249, 280 n.159 (2001). The Mojave Basin is not
on this list since appealing groundwater users are not
bound by the stipulated judgment of the lower court.
103. William Blomquist, Institutions for Managing
Groundwater Basins in Southern California, WATER OUANTITY/
QUALITY MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 43, 46 (Ariel
Dinar and Edna Tusak Loehman eds., Praeger Publishers
1995).
104. id.

services. 10 8 (3) The Central Basin was also
adjudicated after a water district could not
solve overdraft problems. The Central Basin
is currently managed and replenished much
like the West Basin. 10 9 (4) Similarly, a water

district was first created for the Main San
Gabriel Basin, and eventually rights were adjudicated." 0 The basin's safe yield is set
each year and each party is entitled to extract
a share of the safe yield. Overpumping is
taxed and that revenue is used to purchase
water to replenish the basin.'"
Part Ii

A. Why Adjudication?
Overdraft and depletion can be prevented by controlling extraction from the
groundwater basin. But how can extraction
be checked when it is unclear who has a right
to withdraw water? The current system of
groundwater law is fraught with uncertainty. '

2

The California

Supreme

Court

warned that uncertainty "inhibits long range
planning and investment for the development
'.'..113The California legand use of waters .
islature declared that "the efficient use of
water requires certainty in the definition of
property rights to the use of water."' 14 As one
author noted, "Iclurrently, groundwater users
have very uncertain ideas of what their respective rights are if the basin has not been
adjudicated. The state of the law prevents
fulfillment of the constitutional requirement
105. Id.
106. Id. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County's judgment. California Water Service Co. v. Edward Sidebotham & Son, Inc.,

224 Cal. App. 2d 715 (1964).
107. Artificial replenishment entails importing surface
water to spreading basins to percolate into the aquifer beneath.
108. Blomquist, supra note 103, at 46-47.

109. Id. at 47.
110. Id. at 48.
111. Id.
112. Garner, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at
1028.
113. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System,
25 Cal. 3d 339, 355 (1979).
114.

CAL. WATER CODE

§ 1011.5(a) (Deering 2001).
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that water be put to reasonable and benefi5

cial use."''1

For a number of reasons, it is imperative
that adjudication of user rights be the first
major groundwater law reform. First, the past
sixty years of institutional experimentation in
California demonstrate that adjudication is
the necessary first step toward groundwater
management. Only the rights-adjudicated
basins in California are effectively managed.
Second, groundwater is a commons problem
that can only be solved by a private entitlement system. Third, public-private partnerships for conjunctive use and private markets
in water rights are unlikely to be sustainable
practices until groundwater ownership is
clearly defined.
The fact that all sustainable management schemes in California today came about
only after rights to use the groundwater were
adjudicated suggests that adjudication is the
imperative first step to accomplishing a longterm management scheme. Although the Orange County Water District ("OCWD") is often
cited as an institutional solution to overdraft
without adjudication,' 1 6 because OCWD's
management practices are not sustainable, it
is not a model for developing a management
structure. Orange County created a water district in 19331 17 that required every extractor to
register with the OCWD. 118 The district then
began monitoring all pumping and imposing
115. Michael P. Mallery. Groundwater: A Call for a Comprehensive Management Program. 14 PAC.L.J. 1279, 1290 (1983).
116- Susan M. Trager, Emerging Forums for Groundwater
Dispute Resolution in California:A Glimpse at the Second Generation
of Groundwater Issues and How Agencies Work Towards Problem
Resolution, 20 PAC. L.I. 31, 63-64 (1988); ASHLEY & SMITH,
supra note 3, at 44.

117.

CAL. UNCOD. WATER ACTS, Act 5683 (1933

Cal. Stat.

924). Although it was originally created in 1933, the district
was substantially altered by an amendment in 1953 that
authorized the OCWD to operate a replenishment program
and impose pumping taxes within its jurisdiction. 1953
Cal. Stat. 770.
118. Id. at § 24.
119. Two commentators have pointed out that the
OCWD approach ignores pre-existing priorities, thereby
eliminating any advantage of having a pre-existing right in
the basin groundwater. Nonetheless, the court dismissed
all possible constitutional claims resulting from this deprivation in Orange County Water District v. Fransworth, 138 Cal.
App. 2d 518 (1956), wherein it upheld the OCWD manage-

a tax on withdrawals to fund artificial replenishment. There is no set pumping limit for
users." 9 The OCWD prevents overdrafting by
periodically measuring total extraction and
artificially replenishing the basin to compensate for that loss. This system is not a sustainable method of preventing overdraft since
it relies entirely on artificial recharge by imported surface water from the Colorado River
20
and the Northern California State Project.'
The OCWD arrangement is also flawed because, absent defined and transferable pumping rights, users have no incentive to move
21
from lesser to higher valued uses.'
Groundwater depletion is a "tragedy of
the commons." "Groundwater is a fugitive resource that is valuable only when it is captured; and we can expect groundwater basins
' 22
to be overexploited, like buffalo or whales."'
Rational pumpers using the resource believe
that continuing to withdraw groundwater is in
their best interest, even when extraction exceeds natural basin replenishment (thereby
resulting in long-term overdraft and all of its
consequences). Removing an additional unit
of water is perceived as a greater benefit than
the individual cost resulting from a slightly
lowered water table.

123

"Therein is the trag-

edy. Each man is locked into a system that
compels him to increase his lusel ... without
24
limit - in a world that is limited."'

ment method. See George G. Grover & John F. Mann, Jr.,
Acton v. Blundell Revisisted: "Property" in California Groundwater, 18 W. ST. U. L. REV. 589, 596 (1991).
120. See Paula K. Smith, Coercion and Groundwater Management: Three Case Studies and a "Market" Approach, 16 ENVTL. L.
797, 833 (1986).
121. WILLIAM BLOMOUIST, DIVIDING THE WATERS 270 (ICS
Press 1992). See also Blomquist, supra note 103, at 57 (the
author argues that making allocations specific and transferable allows for smooth adjustments in water use).
122. Anderson, supra note 42, at 101.
123. Mallery, supra note 115, at 1285; Barton H.
Thompson, Ir., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the
Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 250 (2000) ("Unfortunately,
groundwater is ...a natural commons. Absent legal constraints, each user has an incentive to pump as much as he
or she needs, even when the cumulative result is a rapid
depletion or overdrafting of the groundwater aquifer.").
124. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
SCIENCE

1243, 1244 (1968).
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A private property system can overcome
the tragedy of the groundwater commons because it can internalize the externalities, both
positive and negative, of extracting groundwater.' 25 On the most fundamental level,
water users will not be able to extract groundwater that someone else owns. 126 In addition, "lwlhen the effects of resource use are
fairly localized, private property better aligns
each owner's interests with the efficient level
of use because each owner faces the full costs
of overconsumption.' 2 7
But to create a private property system
in groundwater, "the sovereign needs identifiable units of property, just as the holders of
those units need sovereign activity, if renewable resources such as groundwater are to
continue their renewability."'1 28 The OCWD
management strategy mentioned above,
which was not premised on adjudication of
rights, has not resolved the "tragedy of the
commons" because users do not have ownership shares that would give them incentives
to keep the basin's water supply sustainable.
"lElven if each pumper pays her pro rata
share of the increased costs, each continues
to have an incentive to go on pumping. The
solution is therefore not just to impose the
increased costs of pumping on all pumpers
pro rata, but to reduce total pumping."' 129 In
order to enforce pro rata reductions when
overdraft is occurring, California's groundwater law must clarify all claims of usufructu30
ary rights to the groundwater.1
Following the "reasonable and beneficial
use" mandate of the California Constitu125. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights,
57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 (1967) ("A primary function of
property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a
greater internalization of externalities."); Anderson, supra
note 42, at 110 ("As the scarcity of surface water and
groundwater increases, privatizing the commons offers the
best hope of getting the highest value from these resources.").
126. SCHILLER & FOWLER, supra note 46, at 36.
127. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, I l I HARV. L. REV.

621. 678 (1998).
128. Earl F. Murphy, Some Legal Solutions for Contemporary Problems Concerning Groundwater and Aquifers, 4 J.MIN. L.&
PoL'Y 49, 111(1988).

tion,' 3 1 only rights to proportionate use should
be determined by adjudication. Allocating
absolute rights will only exacerbate the groundwater commons tragedy. According to one
author:
Property rights can help solve the
tragedy of the commons when the
rights result in the effective internalization of the cost of excessive harvesting, but property rights turn
harmful when they reinforce a sense
of entitlement to an unlimited harvest
• ..ITIhey... can ...cause resource
users, as a matter of fairness, to reject
out of hand even the suggestion that
they should reduce their current usage ...Moreover, property rights may
focus resource users on their individual interests rather than on total societal well being, undermining social
norms of cooperation and reinforcing
the very dichotomy between individual and social welfare that underlies
32
the tragedy of the commons.

There should be no misunderstanding about
the proportionate nature of rights when they
are adjudicated.
In addition, ascertaining proportionate
ownership in each basin is a logical prerequisite to commencing markets in water rights
and allowing private individuals to make conjunctive use arrangements. Groundwater experts have long insisted that groundwater
banking not begin until rights have been clarified. 1 33 But these pleas have been in vain, as

at least twelve conjunctive use projects are
129. Smith, supra note 120, at 810-11. Smith points

out other problems with the system, namely that users are
not paying the entire replacement cost since the surface
water obtained for replenishment is subsidized by the state
and federal governments and many users are exempt or
paying discounted replenishment and equity fees. Id. at
841.
130. Id. at 873-74 ("some kind of allocation is required, regardless of what the other groundwater management scheme components ... may be..
131.

CAL. CONST.

art X, § 2.

132. Thompson, supra note 123, at 257.
133. James H. Krieger and Havey 0. Banks, Ground
Water Basin Management, 50 CAL. L. REV. 56, 69 (1962) ("The
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already operating in California.13 4 The California Department of Water Resources counts
on availability of these arrangements to meet
135
the state's demand for water.
Conjunctive use in non-adjudicated and
non-monitored basins is risky because the
uncertainty in property rights presents a
loophole for wrongdoers to act and evade responsibility. For example, who will be liable
if water quality deteriorates as a result of a
conjunctive use arrangement? 36 Who will be
liable if too much water is stored and flooding results? How can non-contracting parties
be sure that adequate room will be reserved
for naturally recharging water to percolate
into the basin for those who claim rights in
percolating basin water but not in the artificially imported water? 137 How will contracting parties prevent non-contracting
parties from using water that "belongs" to the
contracting parties? 38 Unfortunately, those
desiring to initiate conjunctive use arrangements are unable to incorporate all users into
the agreement to avoid these potential disputes because user rights have not been established.
In the past five years, government agents
and a private company, Cadiz, have conducted numerous studies regarding one such
proposed conjunctive use and water marketing arrangement involving groundwater beneath the Mojave Desert. 39 The Mojave
40
Desert overlies nine groundwater basins
use of groundwater storage for imported water cannot be
completely successful unless the natural local water supply
has been fully adjudicated so that extractions can be controlled and the basin fully managed.").

134.
GRESS

EDELLA

SCHLAGER

& WILLIAM

REPORT: A COMPARATIVE

JUNCTIVE

MANAGEMENT

BLOMOUIST,

1998 PRO-

INSTITUTIONAL

ANALYSIS OF CON-

PRACTICES

AMOrNG

136. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 298.
137. Id.

1

Be-

cause the annual recharge rate is low, experts
believe that the immense quantity of water
now underlying the desert percolated over
thousands of years.

42

In 1990 in the north-

western corner of the watershed, the City of
Barstow sued upstream pumpers, alleging
that they overdrafted the groundwater basin. 143 The Mojave Water Agency cross-com-

plained for an adjudication of water rights in
the watershed. 144 Non-stipulating parties appealed the physical solution to the California
Supreme Court, which resulted in the City of
Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency decision described supra, Part I.D.I. Users who did not
stipulate to the judgment are not bound to
limit their extractions to comport with the
safe yield equation calculated by stipulating
parties.

45

Thus, the future of groundwater in

the northwestern corner remains at risk.
East of the groundwater basins at issue
in City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, the
groundwater beneath the Cadiz and Fenner
Valleys is also at risk. Here, too, groundwater
rights have not been adjudicated. Nonetheless, Cadiz would like to sell and store water
in the basin underlying its 27,000 acres in a
50 year contract with the MWD.

146

The MWD

has considered contracting with Cadiz to
jointly construct a 35-mile pipeline from a
390 acre man-made basin on the Cadiz property to the MWD's Colorado River
138. Id.
139. See infra note 161.
140. Upper, Middle and Lower Mojave River, Harper,
Coyote, Caves, Cronise Valley, Soda, and Silver Lake basins.
141.

METROPOLITAN

WATER DISTRICT, ABOUT THE PROPOSED

http://mwd.dst.ca.us/mwdh2o.data/site%
20trash/aboutcadiz0l.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2002).
CADIZ

PROGRAM, at

142. Blomquist, supra note 121, at 41.

(Dec. 19, 2000).
135. The Department notes that "[wlater users in the
Central Valley, Bay Area, and Southern California having
access to major regional conveyance facilities have ...opportunities to rely on water marketing arrangements and
conjunctive use options . .." CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
WATER RESOURCES, supra note 6, at ES5-1 1.

of water

within a 1300 square mile watershed. 14

THREE

SOUTHWESTERN STATES (Environmental Protection Agency,
National Center for Environmental Research), at http://es.
epa.gov/ncer/progress/grants/95/water/schlager98.html

20 million acre-feet

containing

143. Garner, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 96, at
1045.
144. Id.
145. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal.
4th 1224, 1253, 1256 (2000).
146.

CADIZ,

DRY-YEAR SUPPLY

INC., THE

CADIZ

PROGRAM, at

O&A%20page .pdf.

GROUNDWATER

STORAGE

AND

http://www.cadizinc.com/c/pdf/
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Aqueduct. 47 Under the terms of the proposed agreement, the MWD would be bound
to buy at least 30,000 acre-feet of native
groundwater each year for the first twenty-five
years of the contract, and could elect to
purchase an additional 30,000 acre-feet per
year during that period. 48 In addition, the
MWD could pump up to 150,000 acre-feet per
year of Colorado River water into the aquifer
during wet years, and withdraw that water
49
during dry years.'
Five federal wilderness areas and Joshua
Tree National Park surround Cadiz's property.
Under the implied reservation doctrine, the
United States has the right to water that
50
originates on or beneath reserved parkland
as needed to fulfill the purpose of reserving
the land.' 5' It follows that the federal government may claim rights to the groundwater beneath Joshua Tree National Park as needed to
sustain the park in its current condition, assuming the land was reserved for purposes of
conserving the natural ecosystem. For nonreserved federal land, which includes the five
wilderness areas, the federal government is
likely to defer to state law to determine how
its water rights will be determined. 52 Unfortunately, California's common law system of
ambiguous usufructory rights does not pro-

tect the public interest in maintaining the
water table at its current level, thereby assuring stability of the desert ecosystem. Conserving the desert ecosystem requires
adjudication of public and private rights to
water use to guarantee that Cadiz' project will
not extract water needed to sustain the desert flora and fauna.

53

At least for the short-term, the MWD has
laid concerns about the Mojave Desert
ecosystem to rest with a narrowly approved
board vote on October 8, 2002 to cancel the
Cadiz project.

5

4

After the parties involved

spent nearly five years conducting environmental studies, the MWD voted in the eleventh hour to forego the binding contract and
the Cadiz Groundwater Storage and Dry-Year
Supply Program.'

55

The project is allegedly

"the only California-based storage and supply
project to receive all of its federal environmental approvals."' 5 6

However, the

MWD

board members cited various reasons for rejecting the project, including (1)concern that
environmental questions have not yet been
answered, (2) doubt about Cadiz' financial
stability as a business partner, and (3) uncertainty over the availability of excess Colorado
River water in coming years necessary to
make the conjunctive use project worth-

147. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT, ABOUT THE PROPOSED
PROGRAM, supra note 141; see also METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT & BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, FINAL ENVIRONMEN-

title to the water should be given to the public agency with

TAL IMPACT

154. The motion to cancel the project required a 50%
vote of support to pass, and the motion garnered 50.25%
of the MWD board's weighted votes. Michael A. Hiltzik,
MWD Cancels Desert Storage Project, L.A. TIMES, October 9,

CADIZ

REPORT/ ENVIRONMENTAL

GROUNDWATER
BERNARDINO

STORAGE AND

IMPACT

STATEMENT: CADIZ

DRY-YEAR SUPPLY

PROGRAM.

SAN

COUNTY, CALIFORNIA at http://www.mwd.dst.ca.us/

mwdh2o/pages/news/cadiznet/index.htm.
148. SUMMARY OF METROPOLITAN/CADIZ

ECONOMIC

2002, at B6.
TERMS

(March 6, 2001) available at http://www.mwd.dst.ca.us/mwdh
2o/pdf/news/Cadizsummaryo I.PDF.
149. METROPOLITAN

WATER DISTRICT, supra note

that responsibility).

141.

155. Resources: The Stakes are High - Financially and Politically - For the Santa Monica Company and its Proposed Partner, the
Metropolitan Water District, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 2002, at B3.

150. W. Douglas Karl, Note, Groundwater Rights on Public
Land in California, 35 HASTINGS L.I. 1007, 1010 (1984). ("When
the federal government reserves land [e.g. national parksl
•.. it often expressly or impliedly reserves the water rights
necessary to carry out the purposes of the land reserva-

vice determined that the project will not hurt flora and
fauna; the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency found

tion.").

that it complies with the Clean Air Act and will not ad-

151. ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 18.
152. Karl, supra note 150, at 1022. California recognizes appropriation rights to groundwater beneath public
land. Id. at 1027.
153. SCHILLER & FOWLER, supra note 46, at 33 (suggesting
that when water is needed for environmental protection,

156. Metropolitan Water District Votes on Cadiz Program;
Board Rejects Terms and Conditions of Federal Right-of-Way Grant,
Bus. WIRE, October 8, 2002. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Ser-

versely impact the area's air quality; and the Department of
Interior granted a Record of Decision in August, 2002, for a
right-of-way through federal wilderness land after the Bu-

reau of Land Management worked with the U.S. Geological
Survey and National Park Service to affirm the program's

viability. Cadiz Program Receives Final Federal Environmental Approval; U.S. Department of the Interior Issues Record of Decision,
Bus. WIRE, August 29, 2002.
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while. 15 7 The MWD has yet to certify the Final
Environmental Impact Report/Environmental
Impact Statement and sign final contracts
8
with Cadiz.'1
However, the Cadiz project may not be
entirely derelict, as Cadiz has stated that it
intends to continue pursuing the project and
believes that the MWD is bound to move forward. 15 9 The MWD's decision to forestall a
conjunctive use project in Mojave gives
policymakers an opportunity to protect the
desert ecosystem and assure responsible
groundwater harvesting by adjudicating public and private rights to water use before arranging for widespread water extraction.
B. Why Opt for a New System of
Adjudication Imposed at the
State Level?
In 1978, the Governor's Commission, recognizing that California's groundwater is inby law,160
adequately protected
recommended a new system of adjudication
imposed at the state level. 16 1 But narrow interest groups stymied policy-makers and
groundwater reform efforts drowned. In the
twenty-five years since, the groundwater situation has not improved and the state is still
better positioned than local governments, in
terms of resources and authority, to clarify

158. Cadiz Program Receives Final Federal Environmental Approval, supra note 156.
159. Metropolitan Water District Votes on Cadiz Program;
Board Rejects Terms and Conditions of Federal Right-of-Way Grant,
supra note 156.
CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S Co MM 'N TO REVIEW

NIA WATER RIGHTS

LAW,

FINAL REPORT

62

Part II.A, supra,

demonstrated that clarifying property rights
in groundwater via adjudication is imperative.
This section illustrates why a new system of
adjudication is necessary and why it must be
imposed systematically at the state level.
The current adjudicatory system has numerous flaws. First and foremost, individuals
have no incentive to sue until a basin is over163
doctrine 64

drafted.

The common law correlative rights

is partly to blame because the law
does not restrict the overlying owner's share
until the basin is overdrafted. So groundwater "law" does not check water use until
65
damage to the basin has already occurred.
Second, litigants have trouble ascertaining all
the proper parties through the traditional judicial process. 166 Third, parties have little incentive to reach stipulated judgments since
those who do not agree are not bound to the
physical solution and can litigate their
claims. 167 Fourth, adjudication is lengthy and

expensive, and appeals often delay trial
courts' stipulated judgments from becoming
effective for many years.'

68

Fifth, judges im-

pose physical solutions at one point in time,
but may not engineer them to account for
changes in hydrologic conditions and human
impact on water sources. 169 Sixth, since a

court cannot address an issue until a party
164. For an explanation of the correlative rights doc-

157. Hiltzik, supra note 154.

160.

rights in groundwater use.

CALIFOR-

136 (1978).

161. The Commission recommended dividing the
state into management areas for individual governance by
a local groundwater management authority who may seek
adjudication of rights if management is not otherwise adequate. Id. at 168-69; Deborah A. de Lambert, District Management for California's Groundwater, II ECOLOGY L.O. 373, 394
(1984); Zachary A. Smith, Rewriting CaliforniaGroundwater Law:
Past Attempts and Prerequisites to Reform, 20 CAL. W. L. REV.
223, 240-41 (1984); Mallery, supra note 115, at 1298.
162. Garner, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at
1050.
163. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 289; De Lambert,
supra note 161, at 389.

trine, see supra Part I.
D.I.
165. Mallery, supra note 115, at 1284.
166. De Lambert,' supra note 161, at 390.
167. The California Supreme Court created this negative incentive when the panel held in City of Barstow that
parties' rights will not be affected (unless mutual prescription has been established) if they refuse to sign the stipulated judgment. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency,
23 Cal. 4th 1224, 1253, 1256 (2000).
168. De Lambert, supra note 161, at 389; Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 289. For example, the Central Basin
(under San Gabriel River) adjudication cost $585k (in 1965
dollars) and lasted six and 'h years. Blomquist, supra note
121, at 141. Adjudication of the West Basin underlying
western Los Angeles dragged on for 16 years. Id.at 106.
The Tehachapi-Cummings suit took nine years. De Lambert,
supra note 161, at 389 n.106. Adjudicating the basin at issue in San Fernando took twenty years. Id.
169. Trager, supra note 116, at 61.
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raises it, the standard judicial system is not
70
the ideal forum for effecting reform.'
Nonetheless, adjudication affords
groundwater users many benefits. First, adjudication makes users' ownership interests
certain and definite. Second, when an extractor quits pumping, he can sell or lease his
right, instead of just forfeiting it. 17 1 Third,

judges can tailor remedies to the unique attributes of the basins and their users. 172 One

complish this task because jurisdictional
boundaries do not comport with basin
boundaries. The state is also better situated
to provide funding and enforce regulations, 176
as the costs of managing groundwater basins
can be spread across all water consumers in
the state.
Part III
A. The Proposal

scholar points out that:
The state legislature must pass groundwater reform legislation. The new legislation,
the Groundwater Rights Clarification Act
("GRCA"), should go beyond the 1978 Governor's Commission recommendations, which
offered adjudication as an option for local
management authorities. GRCA should create an adjudicatory process to determine the
use rights to all groundwater in California, exempting only the sixteen basins already adjudicated.

lIt] is important to recognize . . .that
the difficulties encountered by
groundwater users in any given location will depend in large measure on
the properties of the basin on which
they rely ... The attorneys recognize
and write about how much the physical characteristics of groundwater basins differ, and how much those
specific differences matter, while engineers often observe how much the
legal, economic, and political circumstances of groundwater basins differ,
and how much these specific differ73

entities do not. 174 The state legislature has

The Groundwater Rights Clarification Act
should contain the following elements. First,
the state will be divided into management areas that follow the boundaries of natural basins. Second, each basin will have its own
management authority (the "Authority").
Third, all basin extractors will be required to

long reserved the right to regulate ground-

register with the Authority.

ences matter.

The state has authority and resources to
impose effective adjudication, whereas local

water to benefit and protect the public.

75

Be-

cause groundwater moves within a basin,
groundwater management can only be effective when employed across the entire basin.
In most instances, local entities cannot ac170. Sometimes parties assume an issue has been resolved when it has not even been addressed. For example,
apparently no one was aware that public entities had immunity from mutual prescription based on an amendment
to Civil Code § 1007 until the issue came before the California Supreme Court in San Fernando. Blomquist, supra
note 121, at 216.
171. Blomquist, supra note 103, at 55.

Fourth, the Au-

thority will meter all extractions and keep
pumping logs of the entire basin. The Authority will ascertain the basin's safe yield (if
this is not already known) and assess whether
the basin is overdrafted.

78

Fifth, the Author-

176. Garner, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at
1050.
177. The Recordation Act already requires this of all
users in four Southern California counties. CAL. WATER
CODE § 4999- 5008 (Deering 2001).

172. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 289.

178. The Governor's Advisory Drought Planning Panel
observes that, "Itlhe lack of availability of groundwater

173. Blomquist, supra note 121, at 24, 25.

data in various areas of the State ...

174. Garner, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at
1050.

also

77

175. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 104, 105 (Deering 2001); see
CAL. WATER CODE § 12922 (Deering 2001) (declaring the

public interest in protecting groundwater basins from
"overdraft, depletion, sea water intrusion or degraded
water quality.").

[is aj significant im-

pediment to fostering cooperative local and regional solutions to water management needs .

.

. the availability of

groundwater hydrologic data in California lags behind that
of surface water data, in part because of the inherent nature of the resource and to the absence of a statewide system of permitting and reporting groundwater extractions."
GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY DROUGHT PLANNING PANEL, supra note 11,
at 4-9.
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ity will file a suit to adjudicate groundwater
user rights in its jurisdiction. Judges with
special expertise in groundwater law will adjudicate the rights of each basin, taking into
179
account claimed priorities and prior use.
The equitable apportionment test mentioned
in footnote 61 of the San Fernando case,
quoted supra Part Il.D.l, lists factors the
judges should consider.18 0 GRCA will dictate

how to determine necessary parties, select
the judges, limit venue, fulfill requirements of
notice, set parameters of discovery, and preordain the use and effect of the stipulated
8
judgments.' '

GRCA will clarify the rights of all current
users.' 8 2 Civil Code § 1007
must be amended to leave no doubt that municipalities' water claims can (and will) be in1 83
corporated into the basin adjudication.
Adjudication will assign shares for the "right
to extract" to each pumper. These rights will
be expressed as a percentage of total basin
extraction. The right will be identified in relation to the rights of others, and:
and potential

[Alllocation should be limited to the
natural and artificial recharge amount
but should include enough flexibility
in the same time span selected to allow pumping more than annual
recharge in some dry years and to allow storage for replenishment in wet
years ....

[Slome reduction in the al-

location may be required on a pro
179. Adjudicating rights based on prior use runs the
risk that that users who know this in advance will "race to
the pumphouse." Blomquist, supra note 121, at 353; Garner,
Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at 1026. It is unclear
how this phenomenon can be avoided entirely. Since the
judges will consider other factors besides prior use, perhaps extractors will doubt the efficacy of racing to the
pumphouse.
180. However, the judges must consider common law
overlying rights and prescriptive priorities as well. In City of
Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency the California Supreme Court
stated that footnote 61 is not "precedent for wholly disregarding the priorities of existing water rights in favor of equitable apportionment . . . [Wle have never endorsed a
pure equitable apportionment that completely disregards
owners' existing legal rights." 23 Cal. 4th 1224, 1247-1248
(2000).
181. The Governor's Commission proposed these
streamlining procedures in 1978. See CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S
Co M M'N TO REVIEW

CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS

rata basis in order to restrict withdrawal to safe yield. These reductions
should be set out in terms of reducing
a percentage of accumulated overdraft over a period in which withdrawal and recharge can be balanced
and should leave the aquifer with adequate storage room. This should be
made explicit in the original statute
to reduce uncertainty about how re18
ductions will be made.

4

After usufructuary rights are adjudicated,
the basin authority may assess pumping
taxes, stipulate proportionate reductions
when necessary to prevent overdrafting, and
facilitate conjunctive use projects. Since the
statute creates defined yet flexible water allocations, the Authority can choose management strategies that are appropriate to the
5
particular characteristics of its basin.'1

Local efforts that contradict adjudication
will be preempted by the state statute. There
are currently a number of local groundwater
management programs in the state. "Illn California Water Code sections 1220 and 10753,
the Legislature has authorized certain counties to enact groundwater management plans.
Section 1220 expressly and exclusively applies to counties. Section 10753 applies only
to counties that meet its specific requirements. In combination, however, these two
statutes greatly expand the express power of
86
counties to control groundwater exports."'
182. Because the common law does not require overlying owners to extract groundwater to maintain their
rights to it, 62 Cal. Jur. 3d § 398 (1981), the Authorities will
name all overlying landowners as parties and the judges
will determine overlying owners' proportion of current and
potential use.
183. To work with the existing common law framework
and bring all extractors to the table, arguably mutual prescription must be applicable to municipal groundwater extractors. Because the San Fernando court interpreted Civil
Code § 1007 to immunize municipal extractors from prescriptive claims, Civil Code § 1007 should be amended to
clarify that prescriptive rights can be gained against municipal extractors. See supra, Part I.D.l for a discussion of the
San Fernando Court's modification of the mutual prescription doctrine.
184. Smith, supra note 161, at 875.
185. Blomquist, supra note 103, at 53-54.

LAW, supra note

160; De Lambert, supra note 161, at 395-396.

186. Weber, supra note 62, at 380.
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But the California Constitution, Article Xl,
Section 7 only allows a city or county to make
and enforce local ordinances "not in conflict
with general laws."' 18 7 Therefore, locally devised attempts to control groundwater will be
ineffective to the extent they interfere with
the state-mandated adjudication.

Commerce, California Farm Bureau and the
Association of California Water Agencies (collectively referred to herein as the "farming
lobby").

This proposal does not constitute a massive upheaval of current rights in property,
and it will not result in the taking of private
property. 188 Rights created by the common
law system are not extinguished by this arrangement. Following the California Supreme Court's holding in City of Barstow,
priorities will not be ignored, but other considerations will also be relevant. This proposal is
pragmatic, recognizing that
adjudicating rights based on priority alone is
not feasible.'8 9 The state-imposed transition
of surface water rights to a permitting scheme
from a riparian/appropriation scheme demonstrates that it is possible to re-characterize
rights of water use without actually taking the
rights to use water. 90
Furthermore, learning from the lessons
of the past, the proposal can be pitched to
garner support, or at least avoid opposition,
of the farming lobby that defeated the
groundwater rights reform efforts of 19781981.19
A number of scholars have attempted to ascertain the impetus of the
lobby, comprised of the California Cattlemen's Association, California Chamber of
187.

CAL. CONST.

Art

XI § 7.

188. CAL. CONST. Art I § 19 (West 2002) ("Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when
just compensation . . . has first been paid ...").

189. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal.
4th 1224, 1235 (2000) ("The Itriall court ... concluded that
allocating water based on asserted legal priorities would
be 'extremely difficult, if not impossible."').
190. See, e.g., Mallery, supra note 115, at 1304 n.295.
191. Smith, supra note 161, at 242, 246-50 (suggesting
that agricultural groups succeeded in opposing legislation
and defeated the environmental lobby because of political
campaign contributions, membership size, importance of
farming interests to the state economy, and ability to finance television campaigns).

Some believe that the farming

lobby was motivated by a fear of losing local
control to a centralized administration and/or
of losing individual rights (present and future)

B. Why This Approach Can Work

92

to

extract

groundwater.

93

Various

members of the farming lobby were optimistic that surface waters could offset overdrafts,
negating the need for groundwater management reform.

94

One study revealed that in

California and other states that have proposed groundwater reform bills, some bills
passed and others were denied, not because
of opposition/support for central administration per se, but because of sentiment about
the particular administration in power at the
time these bills were proposed.

95

The farming lobby must be convinced
that the state will not deny them rights or
control, but give them more rights and control. The state will not impose particular
management strategies, but only require clarification of usufructuary rights. The system
will better serve current rights claimants because it will minimize future litigation by
making the law more certain and rights more
specific. Claimants will be guaranteed rights
now so that others cannot gain prescriptive
rights against them later. In addition, authorities of adjudicated basins may import surface water to maintain the water table and
prevent overdrafting, keeping the availability
of water at the status quo.

96

192. Zachary A. Smith, Centralized Decisionmaking in the
Administration of Groundwater Rights: The Experience of Arizona,
California and New Mexico and Suggestions for the Future, 24 NAT.
RESOURCES I. 641, 685 (1984); Smith, supra note 161, at 247;
ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 49-52.
193. De Lambert, supra note 161, at 400;
SMITH,

ASHLEY

&

supra note 3, at 50.

194.

ASHLEY

&

SMITH,

supra note 3, at 50.

195. Smith, supra note 192, at 686-687.
196. This would be more sustainable that the OCSD
importation arrangement, critiqued supra Part ILA, because
users would pay the true cost of importing surface water
and water transfers, made possible because only discreet
rights holders will be entitled to extract water, will likely
result in higher-valued uses of the water.
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We know too much about the science of
groundwater, the effects of overdrafting and
the projected water demands of our booming
population to be satisfied with a system that
ignores these facts and promises only uncertainty. Instead of following laws premised on
reality, we have a system resting on the fiction that groundwater is an unlimited commons. It is "perhaps best summarized as the
right to pump as much water as possible until
one is sued."'19 7 California groundwater law

reform is imperative because the current system endorses an unsustainable use of limited
resources statewide. The environmental
community and academic circles know this
already, but to pass state legislation, residents of the state must know this too. We
must convince groundwater extractors and
groundwater consumers that rights adjudication is in their best interests now.

197. Garner, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at
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